Why Iran's Resistance Could Become a Turning Point in the World Order Mengapa Perlawanan Iran Bisa Jadi Titik Balik Tatanan Dunia

Thank you. It's wonderful to meet you again since we last met in Jakarta, and I'm also glad to be on your program. Thank you for the invitation.

When I wrote this book, I didn't imagine the situation would develop the way it has. But I think the book can serve as a kind of guide for understanding how Iran views this war and its conflict with America — why Iran is in this long struggle with America, and also why — which may surprise many — Iran has not surrendered, has not collapsed under American and Israeli pressure, and what truly enables them to endure.

In many discussions, especially in the West, Iran is often simplified as merely a theocracy. In the Western imagination, everything is seen purely through the lens of Islam, of religion. Iranian leaders wear turbans and that's considered sufficient to explain everything — as if the leader is merely a religious fanatic. What is often missed is that ultimately Iran is a nation-state, and a very ancient one. Whoever is in power in Iran — especially like Khamenei and the Islamic Republic that has lasted for decades — fundamentally carries both a historical and national security perspective. That perspective may not be the best for Iran, or not necessarily the most appropriate — that can be debated. But it must be understood as a national security worldview.

Just as we look at China. It is not accurate to call China a communist state, as Secretary Pompeo often did. Whether under Mao, under Xi Jinping today, or previously under Sun Yat-sen, China has always had a national security perspective, as well as a perspective toward its own history. So, I think what we see in Iran is indeed a certain national security perspective born from the Islamic Republic and the experience of its revolution. But it is also rooted in Iran's far longer history.

I begin from there. Iran in its current form was essentially shaped during the Safavid era around 1500. If we look at the period from 1500 to today, there are certain characteristics in how Iran developed. Iran is a country with a historical legacy that far surpasses Islam, stretching back even thousands of years earlier. The country is very proud, has an imperial view of itself — much like China — but is also a wounded nation, also like China. Even today, Iran essentially stands alone in the Middle East.

Religiously, Iran is Shia, making it a minority in the Sunni-dominated Muslim world, both globally and in the Middle East. Linguistically and culturally, Iran is Persian, which also makes it distinct in a region dominated by Arabs and Turks. So this sense of aloneness has long been part of how Iran sees itself — both before and during the Islamic Republic.

In the conflicts experienced with Israel and America over recent decades, Iran sees itself as standing alone in the region, without natural or permanent allies, unlike Arab states that belong to a large family.

Iran's historical experience from the beginning has been as a nation that continually survives. The Safavid dynasty formed the Iranian state by surviving Ottoman expansion. They even strategically adopted Shia Islam so as not to be absorbed into the expanding Ottoman Empire. After the Safavid period, Iran went through various periods of turmoil. Then throughout the 19th century, Iran became a victim of imperialism — losing territory to Russia and Britain. Iran was influenced and exploited very deeply by imperial powers. Unlike Indonesia or other developing countries, Iran never truly became a colony. But like China, Iran experienced a period of humiliation and pressure from European powers.

During World War I, at the end of that period, Iran was nearly divided between Russia and Britain. Iran was occupied, suffered severe economic hardship, and famine. Then Iran entered a phase similar to Kemalism — or like Indonesia and Southeast Asian nations post-colonially, where a strong state-builder emerged: the first king of the Pahlavi dynasty. He made state-building and economic development a survival strategy. That Iran could only survive by becoming economically strong. He followed the Turkish model greatly in building the state.

Yet when Iran began to rise and grow stronger, World War II happened. Three Allied powers — Britain, the Soviet Union, and America — occupied Iran, took its food sources to feed Soviet troops. Iran experienced famine during World War II. Its ruler was replaced. Reza Shah Pahlavi was exiled, and then his son was placed on the throne. After the war ended, the Soviet Union refused to leave Iran. They wanted to take northern Iranian territory and, as they did in Central Asia, turn it into Soviet republics. Ultimately Iran survived because of Cold War dynamics.

A few years later emerged — if we may say — the first Third World leader: Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. His thinking preceded the Bandung phenomenon by about two years, in the period 1951 to 1953, before he was ultimately overthrown. He was someone who said Iran was not part of the East-West conflict, that Iran had the right to its own national resources, and that Britain must relinquish control over Iran's oil or share far greater profits. He was then overthrown in a coup, which of course involved internal forces — much like in Indonesia. The military that carried out the coup was the domestic military, not from outside, but they received external support when overthrowing Sukarno. The same happened in Iran.

After that, Iran spent about 37 to 39 years under the Shah — the second king — during which the country grew rapidly and achieved great progress. But dissatisfaction remained, because the Shah was authoritarian and too pro-American. This, in many ways, is similar to the Suharto era in Indonesia: there was development, there was economic growth, but something still felt wrong. Moreover, Iranian society never truly accepted the Shah, because they saw the coup that returned him to power in 1953 as tainted by American and British intervention.

So there is a kind of long historical burden — since 1500, especially during the period of 19th-century imperialism through the 1953 military coup — that then culminated in the Iranian Revolution. There was an enormous accumulation of historical grievances that shaped the thinking of the revolutionaries. And the 1979 revolutionaries were not all Islamists. There were Marxist-Leninists, there were liberal democrats who stood alongside Khomeini. They all had views on Iranian history, that Iran had been treated unjustly by foreign powers, and had endured two centuries of humiliation.

In some ways, how Mao saw himself as a figure who restored not just China's independence but its true honor through revolution, is also visible in Khomeini's revolution. I even mention in my book — this is interesting — that when the liberal-secular leader of the National Front came to Paris to reach an agreement with Khomeini, he felt the best way to frame the agreement between liberal democrats and Khomeini was to establish that Iran's future government would have two principles: the state would be Islamic and democratic. Khomeini himself added in the margin of the document: "and also independent."

And I truly believe that for Khomeini and Khamenei, the greatest achievement of the Iranian Revolution was giving Iran independence — in their own view. I personally don't fully agree; I think that's somewhat exaggerated, but that is their conviction: that only Islam and the Islamic revolution could give Iran true independence. So in a certain sense, the Islamic Revolution became the vehicle for achieving Iranian independence.

Ali Khomeini can be seen as the last Third World leader. His political thinking framework was not purely the Quran and sharia. Yes, he believed in that, he was an ayatollah, but his political thinking framework was the Bandung Conference. He was influenced by figures like Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh — he was a product of the 1960s. He was very familiar with the writings of Frantz Fanon, understood the Algerian struggle. That was the lens through which he viewed America.

Since the revolution, first under Khomeini then under Khamenei, they have seen the greatest threat to Iranian independence as the United States — imperialism. Essentially, the Islamic Republic was formed like a fortress to guard Iranian independence, albeit in an excessive form. And ultimately, they became trapped in a long four-decade conflict with America to maintain that independence. In the process, they continuously escalated with America, creating permanent enmity, which ultimately brings us to the current situation.

Yes, they are Islamists. But over time, the Iranian leadership we see today is fundamentally a leadership that believes in resistance — in opposition to America and its presence in the Middle East. The main mission is to remove America from Iran — no embassy, no direct communication. Then to remove America from the Middle East, to keep them away from Iran's borders. And in various ways, this becomes a tragic way of thinking for Iran, because the cost that a country as large as Iran must bear to maintain such a position is enormous.

Unlike China, Iran never had its "Deng Xiaoping moment" — the moment when they said, "Enough, let's change direction." That never happened. And the war we see today is ultimately the final defense. There were also important episodes along the way — for example, the eight-year war with Iraq, which greatly shaped the psychology of the Revolutionary Guard and Iran's leadership.

But ultimately, you cannot understand Iran's position today — and I mean here not just its people, because even now many Iranians no longer fully believe in the approach of "resistance by all means." They want to integrate with the world, they want some kind of "Deng Xiaoping moment," they want change. But on the other hand, you cannot understand how Iran's leadership arrived at this point — and what shaped their current position — without understanding the historical burden they carry.

In my view, Islam is not the primary explanation. Islam is more of a language — the language of power, the language of politics. But the logic behind how Iran arrived at its position today actually comes from how the 1979 Iranian Revolution read their history — in an exaggerated way — as a history of struggle against weakness, humiliation, and imperialism. They see themselves as having "corrected" that history.

I'll close with one example. About several months ago, former Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, in an interview with American media, Foreign Policy, stated that the Islamic Republic is the first government in 200 years of Iranian history that has truly delivered sovereignty and independence. I personally don't fully agree. But that statement shows the dominant framework of thinking within the Islamic Republic. So you must understand that history — how they read it, and how they see themselves as the party correcting history — to understand Iran today.

That's true. I think there could actually be a "Deng Xiaoping moment" in Iran — for instance if a revolutionary leader stepped forward and said, "We must end the revolutionary phase, begin integrating with the global economy, and change direction." That's actually quite popular among the Iranian public now. One problem Iran faces currently is that its society is no longer fully committed to revolutionary values or the early decades of the revolution. But that never materialized, because there was no leader strong enough like Deng Xiaoping. Even in China itself, Deng needed seven years to defeat the "Gang of Four" and Hua Guofeng and truly consolidate power.

In Iran, there were actually some moments when — the first post-war president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, tried to push Iran in a different direction. In the end, Khamenei won as Supreme Leader, and Iran remained on the path of "resistance". Or when Mohammad Khatami became president, he wasn't strong enough to change direction. The same with Hassan Rouhani. But now, after Iran has been engaged in conflict with America and Israel, the tendency has actually moved in the opposite direction. If we compare it to China, what has grown stronger is the "Gang of Four." One thing that happened is that Israel has eliminated, so to speak, Iran's generation of Mao and Zhou Enlai (the revolutionary generation). And those who have risen are not the "Deng Xiaoping type," but the Gang of Four. For example, Ali Larijani — he could actually be considered Iran's "Zhou Enlai."

I even mention in my book that a senior Iranian statesman met with Henry Kissinger and had discussions. At the time I didn't name him because he was still alive and I didn't want to trigger negative reactions within Iran. But now that he has passed — he was killed — He met Kissinger in a meeting very similar to Kissinger's early meetings with Zhou Enlai, and had a strategic conversation. Israel killed Larijani. Larijani's replacement will likely be one of Iran's most hardline IRGC generals — or former general. He is the type of person who could be said to be part of the "Gang of Four." So at this moment, because of these wars, Iran is not moving toward a "Deng Xiaoping" direction. If there will be such a moment, it would likely have to come in the future, under different conditions, depending on how this war ends.

I always hope there's still a possibility. I think especially if this war doesn't produce a clear result, for either America or Iran, they will eventually have to find their way back to... If there's a positive side to this war, perhaps it is that both sides realize they must truly negotiate.

In my view, what happened to the JCPOA is a tragedy. Because it was a moment when Iran's leader, Khamenei, gave room to his president to try the negotiation path. At that time they were facing heavy sanctions. They saw that there was a president in America — Barack Obama — who might be more trustworthy than previous presidents. He approached Iran in the right way — writing letters to the Supreme Leader, several secret letters. For the first time, in his public messages, he referred to the country by name, not merely as the regime. And he also affirmed that his goal was not regime change. He even received much criticism for not intervening in Iran's Green Movement. But the positive side for the US was that Khamenei became convinced this wasn't just American deception. Iran finally agreed to sit at the negotiating table.

Regardless of whether it was a good deal or not — even according to Iran itself it wasn't a great deal — they still signed it. And Iran quickly fulfilled its part. Even the US Atomic Energy Agency issued 11 consecutive reports stating that Iran was complying with the JCPOA. Meanwhile, America didn't really carry out many of its promises. Sanctions were difficult to lift, and in the end were not truly lifted. Then America basically took everything Iran had given, withdrew from the agreement, and imposed even heavier sanctions than before. This left a very deep bitterness in Iran — that for the first time they trusted the diplomatic process, tried to engage, and this could have been the beginning of gradual normalization over several years if the agreement had held, with subsequent agreements built upon it, Iran might have gradually opened up. But what happened was the opposite. Iran retreated into its "cocoon," and economic sanctions with maximum pressure also transformed Iran — impoverishing society, weakening the private sector, and actually strengthening the Revolutionary Guards, creating a new oligarchic class linked to the shadow economy born of sanctions.

And Iran actually returned to the negotiating table in the Trump era — twice. But each time, in the middle of negotiations, they were attacked militarily. So in my view, the JCPOA was actually an opportunity for both sides to build something from an initial agreement, after so many decades, and move forward. And the war happening now is essentially taking place in the shadow of the JCPOA's collapse. This is the consequence of the lessons drawn by Trump, and also the lessons drawn by Iran — which brought them to this point.

One of the problems facing the opposition in Iran is — and I think the Islamic Republic itself also has major problems with its people — that some Iranians today were even born after the revolution. They no longer want to live in isolation. They no longer believe that the absolute independence worldview pushed by Khamenei is truly necessary. They ask, why can't we be like China, Russia, or Turkey? Those countries also aren't "servants" of America. They remain independent, but they're not as isolated as we are. And this generation now wants a different future. Even those still somewhat close to the Islamic Republic feel increasingly pressed by the economic burden. So they want some path of compromise with the West so sanctions can be lifted. As a result, the Islamic Republic's base has become far narrower than before. Its society is increasingly dissatisfied. But this dissatisfaction has not yet given birth to a political movement within the country. In other words, there are indeed many civil society figures, political activists — most in prison. There is no liberation movement or political movement that can truly organize that dissatisfaction into a serious opposition.

Reza Pahlavi has captured the imagination of many Iranians. One reason is that over time, the Pahlavi period has actually become increasingly popular in Iran. This is actually not foreign to Indonesia. You have a president who is part of the Suharto era legacy. Over time, people's views can change, even nostalgia for authoritarian periods can emerge. The Shah period is now being viewed as a kind of "golden age." Yes, there was a dictator, there was a secret police, but even now they don't feel they live in a full democracy. In those days, the currency's value was far stronger, closer to the dollar. They could travel. The country was relatively prosperous. Cultural freedoms were greater. Many things young people dream of today actually already existed at that time.

Additionally, social media and television broadcasts from the diaspora — often supported by Israel, Saudi Arabia, and America — also fuel this nostalgia within Iran. I think Reza Shah (the first) remains very popular in Iran because he was a state-builder. Ironically, the current speaker of the Iranian parliament — about a decade ago — even called himself the Hezbollah version of Reza Khan. Meaning even he understood that what Reza did in Iran was extraordinary — lifting the country from near-collapse and building a state. The Shah period in the eyes of Iranians also looks far more "rehabilitated" compared to the 1979 perception. His son Reza Shah has become the beneficiary of this nostalgia. His image and statements represent the future that many Iranians envision. A future where Iran is like other Middle Eastern countries that are open, integrated with the world.

But the problem is, popularity alone is not enough. There must be political organization for that to have meaning. So yes, he may be popular, but he has no structure within Iran that can transform that popularity into a real political movement. Second, he has also made quite strange choices, especially in the last two wars. He sided with the countries attacking Iran, particularly Israel. There are indeed some Iranians who support him because they are so angry at the Islamic Republic that they're willing to side with the enemy. But generally, this position contradicts the spirit of Iranian nationalism. So in my view, his momentum has actually passed. Its peak was actually before this war. After the war and the destruction experienced by the Iranian people, I think he is no longer a viable candidate for leadership going forward. Unless American tanks enter Iran — like in Baghdad or Kabul — I think, even if the Islamic Republic collapses, the next leader will emerge from within Iran, someone who can reunite the remnants of the state, and essentially claim leadership over the country. Someone — for example, like Ahmed al-Sharaa we saw in Syria. So not a leader from exile who is "parachuted in" by Israel or America, unless those countries are truly in Tehran and can determine who comes to power.

I think generally, Iranian society, both inside and outside the country, is very divided. Perhaps never as divided as this in the country's history. Partly because of the Islamic Republic's own policies — which have created alienation domestically, as well as high levels of despair. When major protests occurred in January 2026 before the war, and the government cracked down very harshly, in the end many believed that very many — tens of thousands of Iranians — were killed by the Iranian regime in a short time. At that point there briefly emerged a kind of consensus that the Islamic Republic had lost legitimacy. Perhaps only about 10–15% of the population was still truly attached to it. However, both inside and outside, the view was the same: this system is finished, it must be replaced entirely by something new. Before that could develop into a real political movement, the war rushed in.

And this war has further divided Iranian society. First, between those — especially abroad — who support the Reza Pahlavi monarchy, and also others who actually support the war, hoping the war will liberate Iran, that America and Israel will topple the regime, and that war is the price to pay for that. And a similar view exists within Iran — there are people who say, "Fine, let the bombs come, we'll endure it, as long as this regime falls." But as the war drags on, there grows an awareness within Iran that this war is not liberating — this war is actually destroying the country, destroying infrastructure. People are truly dying. Iranian society is truly facing and hearing bomb explosions, and living in the shock of bombs. Perhaps there are still a small few who believe this war will determine everything. But the consensus that once existed has now fractured. Now an even larger gap has emerged between those outside who support the war, and those inside the country, who must truly live through it.

So I think the Iranian public today — especially those inside the country — is a very traumatized society. This is a country that was previously under "maximum pressure" sanctions, already experiencing tensions with the Islamic Republic, feeling abused by power, then experienced war in June 2025, then experienced a wave of uprising and massacre in January 2026. And now faces war again, which in their view is very dangerous for the country's future because America is talking about the possibility of invasion, destruction of infrastructure, even, looking at President Trump's rhetoric, "I will set Iran back decades," "I will destroy them. I will flatten them." At the same time, they also see that the current Islamic Republic — post-Khamenei and Larijani — is far harsher. So this is a society very traumatized by everything that has happened.

Actually, very little is publicly known about him. Even in Iran, people used to say he was the most powerful person in Iran who was never truly seen or heard. But from his biography, we know that before becoming a cleric, before entering seminary, he was a Revolutionary Guard soldier. He volunteered, participated in the Iran-Iraq war, and even fought in a fairly well-known unit. His career is very different from his father's. His father never participated in war, but spent much time in prison during the Shah's era — a very different experience. Meanwhile young Khamenei, Mojtaba, is a war veteran, and was a member of the IRGC before eventually entering seminary and becoming a cleric. Even some clerics assess that his religious credentials are actually stronger than his father's when he was still president. Even so, he is not a grand cleric in the religious sense. But he did become a cleric, even taught in Qom and Tehran. However after that, he essentially entered his father's circle of power. He became part of the Supreme Leader's secretariat, and could be said to be one of the two or three most important people providing advice, a kind of chief of staff. That position gave him enormous power, because he could see almost everything in Iran — from judicial, political, business, to military affairs. And specifically, because of his background, he became very involved in IRGC affairs.

So, in terms of promotions of commanders — who gets which position — the person who for almost two decades led IRGC intelligence turned out to be his comrade from the war period. A very influential and also very feared figure in Iran named Hossein Taeb, who was very close to Mojtaba. So we know that he essentially comes from the security and military environment within the Iranian state. But he also understands state affairs, and has religious credentials.

However from those closest to him, it appears that he is likely far more hardline than his father. Looking back, we now know that senior Khamenei — despite being a true revolutionary, Third-World-oriented, and quite radical, he was also full of caution. For example, he once issued a fatwa that Iran must not possess nuclear weapons. This fatwa may not be very important to America, but is very important to the religious base in Iran as a firm statement, "We will not build the bomb." He also did not allow the IRGC to develop very long-range missiles. His responses tended to be symbolic when America killed General Soleimani or in attacks on Iran's nuclear program. He didn't respond further.

Mojtaba comes from a generation and worldview that believes restraint is what invites aggression against Iran. That if Iran had been more aggressive from the start, the situation today would not be like this. Then there is the question of how he could become Supreme Leader. For a long time, people thought Khamenei was preparing him. In my book, I mention that Khamenei believed the ideal Supreme Leader was not the highest cleric, but someone who understood religion, understood state governance, and also understood military affairs. Which is a combination of various different things. And Mojtaba fit that profile. But towards the end, it appears Khamenei changed his mind — perhaps feeling Mojtaba was too extreme, or worried it would look bad if the Islamic Republic, born fighting against monarchy, were to pass power from father to son. There were even reports among the elite that he wrote a letter to the Assembly of Experts asking them not to appoint Mojtaba.

If the war had not happened, and Khamenei had passed away normally, the Assembly of Experts would most likely have chosen a leader capable of handling the aftermath of the January uprising. But in reality, the succession process occurred during war, while Iran was under attack in war. Several things became very important. First, the voice of the IRGC became far more prominent. Interestingly, this is not the generation of IRGC that Khamenei once chose — because many of them had already been killed by Israel. So the new generation that emerged are not the people Khamenei once chose. And these are the ones who essentially pushed Mojtaba. They wanted their own leader. They want a Supreme Leader who understands state affairs and is ready to act immediately. For them, national security is the top priority. Even some members of the Assembly of Experts later admitted that in wartime conditions, security factors are more important than theological considerations in choosing a Supreme Leader.

And I think the point you made earlier is also very important. There's one interesting thing about how Khamenei passed away. In the first war of June 2025, Israel tried to kill him but could not find him — he disappeared underground. After the war, he was also not accessible, it was unclear where he was. But he started to surface again as the war drew closer, around February after January. Even on the weekend when everyone felt war was on the verge, he actually scheduled meetings at his office — above ground. As if welcoming the war. For the Iranian Shia community, the manner of his passing appeared like a Karbala moment. And Mojtaba's story also reflects Karbala — his father died, his mother died, his wife, his child, his siblings, his nephews. It truly appeared like a Karbala moment. That actually became a source of strength for him. As if his greatest credentials were not Shia theology, but Shia mythology. Because in war, what's needed is not theology — but a moment like Imam Hussein. As if this were "the Battle of Karbala." And it is at that point that his charisma emerged. His election moment did not arise from political, military, or religious experience alone, but from his personal experience.

In a war situation, for the IRGC and the regime, what matters most is not mobilizing the entire Iranian people, but strengthening the core of the regime's power that determines their survival — about 10–15% of the population. This group is the one that emotionally responded to the way Khamenei died and the suffering endured by Mojtaba. While the majority of society might actually fear Mojtaba for the reasons we've already discussed. But this 10–15% group immediately felt connected to him and consolidated behind him.

Now, what can we expect from him? We actually don't know yet. But looking at his track record — he has from the start been classified as hardline. The people he has placed in important positions are also not moderates. When Larijani passed, his replacement — whom I mentioned earlier — is a close associate of Mojtaba and a very hawkish general. So the people around him are the hardline group, not moderates. And we also don't know what psychological burden he carries — all the personal wounds from this war from the deaths of his father, wife, child, mother. Because of that, Iranian society is now bracing for what will happen after the war. What is clear, from what has already been visible under Mojtaba, Iran is now essentially an IRGC state.

No. I think it would actually be more strange if after truly coming to power, he suddenly became something different. There is a very slim possibility that he becomes a Deng Xiaoping, feeling "I'm in power now, it's time to take a new direction." But far more likely, especially if the conflict between America and Iran is not resolved in this war, and Iran must continue to be wary of the possibility of the next attack, that will also greatly determine the direction he takes. That means he is no longer bound by his father's fatwa, and no longer bound by restrictions on the nuclear program. And I think the people now rising to positions of power under Mojtaba — even within the IRGC — are those who believe that senior Khamenei's restraint was a mistake.

In a narrow sense, the "decapitation" strategy did succeed because they really did kill people. Even last June, they killed about 30 Revolutionary Guard commanders. With the hope of regime change or collapse. Let's say the regime would just collapse. Regime change is happening now, but not the kind of regime change Trump wanted, that this would end with a leader more cooperative with the US. Quite the opposite — the most radical faction of the IRGC has risen to power. And the regime itself has not collapsed. One reason is that from the start the Islamic Republic was designed to survive, not to be popular.

In the early years of the revolution, when they faced the left — especially the organization that still exists today, MEK, the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization — when that group engaged in a power struggle with the Islamic Republic in the early years, they killed many Islamic Republic leaders. But the Islamic Republic survived, and since then, power has been increasingly distributed to various centers. That's why Iran doesn't function well, or you hear different things from different places. But authority in Iran — especially in decision-making — is actually spread among many people and various organizations, both inside and outside the system. The Supreme Leader is indeed the final determinant, but in practice, decision-making is spread. And this is precisely what enabled Iran to survive in the 12-day war. You can kill 30 IRGC commanders, but the system continues to function. Even after that, between June 2025 and February 2026, this system has been further decentralized. They call it a "mosaic." Iran is not a top-down pyramid structure, but a mosaic — where each part knows what to do and has its own operational authority. Sometimes they must report upward, but not always. You might kill the Supreme Leader, but the system continues to function. You can kill the head of the missile division, but the system continues. So you must "decapitate" very many parts of the state over a long period to truly paralyze the system. This is the opposite of the Shah era system — which was very centralized around one person. When that person was incapacitated in the revolution and could not make decisions, no one could make decisions; Iran's military could not make decisions. There was no operational capability because everyone was waiting for orders from the Shah. The current system is the exact opposite. And because of that, America and Israel are increasingly targeting infrastructure — because they see the only way to bring down the system is to weaken the state's ability to function and fight. But even here, Iran has built resilience — for example, electrical networks that are more distributed and decentralized, even compared to Israel. The distribution of various kinds of services is spread across the country. All of this stems from the fact that Iran, in many ways, has been in a state of war for 47 years. Not open war, but a kind of cold war, that occasionally erupts into economic war, and increasingly they have learned that the way to survive is not to allow any single point to be "decapitated" at once. And now, as we speak — after Khamenei was killed — this seems to have been part of their planning for a war they knew was coming. Essentially, the IRGC has become a kind of partisan army. This is truly a "guerrilla state." No longer a state as it once was. Essentially they are running an asymmetric war against the United States, with a state that functions as if it were a guerrilla army. That is why it is very difficult for Israel and the United States to finish it from the air. And if they try to finish it from land, that will be far more difficult, because of the way they have organized themselves.

In my view, it was largely Israel that sold this idea to the US. There is something different about the US currently under Trump, in decision-making compared to previous administrations. Usually, you identify the problem first. For example, the CIA, State Department, Pentagon identify the problem. Then the entire government tries to find ways to deal with it — economically, diplomatically, militarily — and then gradually an argument is built for why a certain solution, for example a military solution, is necessary. That idea is then "sold" to allies, to media, to the public. Even in the Bush era, the reason that Iraq was building nuclear weapons was actually untrue. But the problem was identified first, that Iraq was building nuclear weapons. Then an argument was built that the only way to stop it was through the military. So we'll do it.

Trump made the decision to go to war, perhaps because he was convinced by Netanyahu. The way he makes decisions or receives information is from high-position people who speak directly to him — whether influential Arab leaders, Erdogan, billionaires who meet with him, or Netanyahu. They sold the idea that this needs to be done, perhaps it's good for him, perhaps he'll be seen as the first American president to solve the Iran issue, fix the Middle East, retaliate against Iran's threats against him — whatever the argument. He then decided to go to war, then ordered the military to prepare. And apparently he didn't think through it very deeply. He thought this would be quick. He was convinced that if Khamenei were neutralized, the situation would be like Venezuela — which he boasted about. There would be a figure like Delcy Rodríguez in Tehran who would emerge and talk to him. It was initially thought to be Larijani, then now considered Ghalibaf, all of which is not based on fact. And this is clearly visible because he never really explained it to the American public, even in his State of the Union address. Essentially, after the war with Iran had been going on for more than a week, various different explanations began to emerge about why the US went to war. As if Trump already had a solution, but never explained what the problem was and why the problem was so urgent that it was worth risking oil prices and other things.

And I'm sure Trump didn't expect that after 28 days, he'd still be in the war. He was surprised because the Iranian state did not collapse. He was also surprised when Iran began to fight back, and was truly unprepared when Iran ran a guerrilla war against the global economy — by targeting the Strait of Hormuz and creating a conflict arena where Iran can escalate at a level matching America. So if you attack our gas fields, we'll attack Qatar's gas fields. You can't do anything. If you attack our infrastructure, we'll attack infrastructure in the Gulf region. So he was truly unprepared for all of this. So now, looking back, the reason why this war was necessary was never really made clear. He never presented evidence for why this war needed to happen. Then it's clear that either he dismissed things he didn't want to hear, or wasn't told, but the fact is, the assumptions he carried when starting the war all proved wrong. After Khamenei was killed, Iran did not collapse. Even after massive bombardment the regime did not fall. There was no preparation at all for the Strait of Hormuz. No preparation at all if Iran attacked American bases in the Gulf, or attacked Gulf states, or attacked energy infrastructure, or attacked global trade routes passing through the Persian Gulf. None of that was ever truly prepared for.

So in one sense, he's now trapped in a dilemma. His original strategy did not work. He cannot accept defeat. He also cannot claim victory, because the definition of victory now has actually become opening the Strait of Hormuz — which was actually already open before the war. And he has no way to open it without making a deal with Iran, which would be considered a defeat by the United States. So the only path he sees is escalation against Iran, with the hope of doing something that forces Iran back to the negotiating table — for example seizing Kharg Island, or attacking and seizing other Iranian islands. But the Iran we're talking about — which I explain in the book — is not an Iran that will back down. I think Iran's instinct now is to escalate against escalation. So if you take Kharg Island, we'll do something big too. And because of that, in my view, Trump has now created a situation that has already trapped him. And the longer this continues, the greater the impact on other things that also matter — for example for Southeast Asia, not only economically, but also America's position vis-à-vis China. In many ways, China could be the big winner of all that is happening.

There are two kinds of accountability. The first is when the international community demands accountability. And usually, the international community of this kind is based in the West — Western media, Western governments — and that is all not happening now. We even see this during the Gaza war, where there was essentially a collapse of accountability when it lies on the Western side. Accountability is always directed at China, Iran, Russia, Third World countries, but not at Western countries or their allies. The second kind of accountability is the price America must pay — both economically and in the form of lost global prestige, and weakening of its position in great power rivalry, particularly with China. And in my view, that price will ultimately emerge.

In reality, Iran has become a country that has chosen to stand up to the United States. Even countries like Colombia or Brazil, that were briefly firm against the US, ultimately met with Trump and then said, "Our meeting was very good, and I will not carry out the threats I made." But [Ali] Khamenei refused, and so does Mojtaba. And this places Trump in an uncomfortable position, needing to move to the next level. And I think America is now very close to what is called "imperial overreach." In other words, having to take steps that will actually harm itself. For example, Obama was the first president to say that America had spent too long in the Middle East in costly unnecessary wars. We need to stop and start focusing on Asia — pivot to Asia. Trump came and although he didn't use the term "pivot to Asia," essentially his policy direction was the same. And then Biden also did similarly. Now, the second Trump administration is basically reversing that direction. He is starting something that could lead to a long and costly war in the Middle East, and that will change America's global profile. That will open a window of opportunity for China — toward Taiwan, toward global trade, and various other things. This will also impact Ukraine in its war with Russia. Will affect Europe's ability to face Russia. Will affect the European economy, and ultimately also America's own economy.

So in one sense, Trump comes with a kind of euphoria toward American unipolar power — that America is the pre-eminent superpower, which can dictate through threats or economic pressure whatever it wants. But now he is overwhelmed himself. And whatever happens to Iran, if he escalates to the next level and forces regime collapse, America will be impacted by that chaos, like it or not. If he has to make peace with that regime, that too will be costly for America. So in my view, in one sense, this war — we are still inside its fog, still in the middle of it — but when everything clears, we will see this moment as a turning point, not just for the Middle East, but for American power.

Well, Iran's national security adviser comes in various forms. Some are stronger and more influential than others. But this is clearly a very powerful position, because its function is similar to the national security adviser in America. This is the gateway to the Supreme Leader. He coordinates the security apparatus from various parts of the government to produce decisions.

Now, I think the first impact of Zolghadr's appointment is the signal that Iran is not — This is not a figure you would choose if you want to make peace or open talks with the United States. Zolghadr represents the hard side of the IRGC, which means Iran's tendency is escalation responded to by escalation. That's what he represents. He's an extreme figure. Now, it may be that after the war he is no longer in this position, and Mojtaba chooses someone else. If entering a negotiation phase, perhaps Zolghadr is no longer there, or Mojtaba decides the process will be handled by the foreign ministry or others. But for now, he is the one who will determine who sits at the negotiating table. Much of the information flow to and from Mojtaba will pass through him. He is the face — the link between Mojtaba and military commanders and government officials. So at this moment there is no doubt that he is essentially an Iranian figure much more focused on security, and very hardline. Whether he can manage this role well, how good he is as a manager, all of that remains to be seen. But for now, what we can read is that the figure who previously was more like a statesman has been replaced by someone who is far more a hardline field person. And again, because the situation in Iran is now very closed, we don't really know what decisions he's making, or what role he's playing in new IRGC appointments. But his very presence is already a very strong signal, both inward and outward, about Mojtaba's position. What are his current tendencies?

Yes, that is delusional. First, thinking that you can bypass the Supreme Leader and simply choose someone, as if a figure like Larijani or Ghalibaf is strong enough to bring the entire system along with them. And also, it's true that with someone like Larijani, you might get a more productive conversation, and he might be able to "sell" an agreement into the system. But you still need a realistic agreement — one that they can truly "sell" to their own country. A "yes man" figure like Delcy Rodríguez — neither of them will play that role, and Iran is also not in that position. But in the long run, removing the old statesmen and replacing them with figures like Zolghadr will actually make it harder to end the war and open diplomatic negotiations. Because in government, regardless of any policy, ultimately, when you have a table around the president, the Supreme Leader, or the President of the United States, what truly matters is who sits there. And also what kind of advice they give, and how they interpret various situations. So the more radical the composition of that table, the less likely talk of compromise or negotiation will get space. In other words, the United States — together with Israel which may have different goals — is actually helping to shape a "table" in Tehran that is not what Trump wants, because it will be increasingly difficult to communicate with the people in it.

Well, first, I think Trump's thinking is, "If I take Kharg Island or other territories, Iran will collapse." Yet, as I discuss in the book, in 1980 Iraq attacked Iran, seized Iran's major port, and occupied Iranian territory. It took two years for Iran to organize guerrilla forces that eventually became the Revolutionary Guard, to finally retake its territory. And after that, the war still continued for six more years. But those first two years were enough to show that Iran will continue to attack America on Kharg Island or wherever that may be. And they are patient, because their historical experience is like that. It took two years, without help from anyone. The world then helped Saddam — Arab states, the Soviet Union, America, Europe — all helped Saddam. Iran was alone. No one helped. But after two years, they found a way to expel Iraq. And the same psychology is now embedded in the IRGC. That's how they will respond. They will also escalate in their own way. What form the escalation takes, we don't yet know. They might attack massively a number of Gulf states. They could attack shipping lanes. The Houthis could join in and close Bab el-Mandeb, which for Southeast Asia means trade going through Europe via the Indian Ocean could halt. That would also mean oil sent by Saudi Arabia through Yanbu at the Red Sea would stop. So this would put enormous pressure on markets. The scale of war will expand, and ultimately if Iran decides to continue escalating against escalation, then Trump will face a dilemma: does he continue to further escalate, or try to negotiate his way out? However, Iran seems determined not to be forced to surrender. They actually feel they are gaining strategic advantage. Iran is not interested in a ceasefire that only returns them to their pre-war position — which is being under maximum pressure, open to being attacked at any time by Israel and America, and facing domestic anger. They don't want to return to that situation. They say they don't want a ceasefire, but want an end to the war. What does "end of war" mean for them? Guarantees of no more war against Iran, economic compensation, control over the Strait of Hormuz as a deterrent against future wars — and perhaps also as a source of revenue — as well as US military bases being withdrawn and Israel having to reach a ceasefire with Hezbollah. Some of these demands are indeed very unrealistic. But what they actually want is for this war to result in a situation that is truly different from before the war. After all the suffering they've endured, if they simply surrender, that makes no sense to them. Therefore, they are willing to continue escalating with the belief that it is the US that will tire first. In their view, this is not about who has better weapons, but who has a higher threshold for endurance against pain.

Who has greater staying power. And they believe they have that. I often joke, many listeners may remember the Muhammad Ali vs George Foreman fight years ago. Iran's strategy is like Muhammad Ali, let the opponent tire out. Let them keep punching. As long as we can endure, eventually they will run out of energy. The longer this fight goes on, from round one to round eight to round fifteen, it is actually the US and Israel that will lose strategic advantage, while Iran will gain it. Moreover, Iran has prepared for this war for a long time. They know that if they control the Strait of Hormuz, this is what the US might do. So I think they're not the ones surprised — they have a plan. If they succeed in executing it, this war could become worse and longer.

Israel and the United States essentially have only one approach, namely vertical escalation. That is, if they drop 20 bombs, they can drop 40 bombs. If they kill 10 leaders, they can kill 20 leaders — more of the same things they've already done. Meanwhile, Iran's escalation is horizontal, by continually opening new fronts. So it starts from the Gulf region, then can expand to Bahrain, Iraq, Yemen, the Persian Gulf, and then to the Red Sea, with the aim of spreading the conflict. For Iran and also groups like Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias like Hashd al-Shaabi, and others, this is a struggle for survival. They must get through this phase first before thinking about the future.

There are areas where anti-Shia sentiment could increase, such as in Lebanon, where there is already hostility toward Hezbollah. Many Lebanese don't want to be dragged into this war. They feel annoyed because Hezbollah is dragging them into the conflict. Now there is also a Sunni government in Syria that is very hostile to Hezbollah because of their role in supporting Assad. In Iraq, the Sunni community could also feel displeased with the involvement of Shia groups. The same could happen in Gulf states. However, in many other parts of the Arab world and in South Asia, the atmosphere at the societal level is different. There are a number of very conservative figures — not necessarily to be called extremists — from Deobandi seminaries, often associated with Sunni sectarianism in India and Pakistan, who say this is not the time for division, that we should stand with Iran. There are even hardline Sunni groups who attended prayers after Khamenei's death. So there is also a sentiment being utilized by Iran — a sentiment that in the Middle East has actually long been present beneath the surface, or perhaps also in Indonesia and Malaysia stemming from the Gaza war. Anger at America and Israel, and what happened in Gaza to the Palestinian people. Because of that, the situation cannot be viewed as a simple line between Sunni and Shia. Even on the internet, many Sunnis say this is not a sectarian moment. This is a situation where Iran is seen as carrying out resistance that they actually hope their own leaders would carry out. Of course, this doesn't mean Sunnis in Bahrain would agree with that — or Sunnis in Kuwait, or Lebanon. But it's clear that the Sunni vs Shia dividing line is no longer as simple as it was a few years ago. Iran's narrative now also emphasizes resistance against imperialism and American aggression. For Iran this extends beyond that, to outside the Muslim world — to Latin America, Mexico, Central America, even among progressives in the West. This is due to dislike of Donald Trump, and the emotional impact of the Gaza war and the lack of accountability as you mentioned. As a result, there emerges a kind of half-hearted support for Iran. These people don't live in Iran, so they don't really consider how the Islamic Republic governs or treats its people. They more respond to the image of Iran as a party standing against America. Even at this moment, there is more sympathy for Iran than for Gulf states and most of the Muslim world. We don't see the broader Muslim world moving to criticize Iran for its attacks. However, this situation can change. But what's clear, Iran currently does not feel isolated at the societal level. They are more isolated at the decision-making level — where many country governments are neutral or even support the American position in the region.

Yes, ultimately all wars will end at the negotiating table, unless the Iranian regime truly collapses so there is no longer a party to negotiate with — like what happened in Syria or Libya. But if the Islamic Republic survives, then the United States at some point must negotiate with it. The US has negotiated with the Taliban. The US also negotiated with North Vietnam. They did try to keep bombing North Vietnam for a stronger bargaining position, but ultimately still had to negotiate. Iran will not get everything it wants, but it will also not surrender to what Trump is offering. The 15-point plan presented to Iran is essentially a form of surrender, and they will not accept that. So we could say both sides may have to fight long enough until each side's position changes: Iran becoming more willing to compromise, and Trump starting to realize he must give something more than before the war.

There is a possibility Iran is willing to significantly reduce its nuclear program, for example, in exchange for real gains such as control over the Strait of Hormuz and concrete economic benefits. Iran wants a situation where they are guaranteed that six months from now they won't be attacked again. How to get that guarantee is very difficult to imagine. However, according to Iran, China must play a major role in providing those guarantees. That China and Russia need major involvement in the Middle East. The United States is currently not ready for that, but at some point, they may have to accept it if they want to end the war. From Iran's perspective, they need to keep fighting longer so the US will soften from its arrogance. Trump hasn't truly realized he needs to compromise. Trump thinks he needs to pressure Iran further or even seize its territory so Iran surrenders from its position. Most likely, the final outcome will be somewhere in between. The best scenario is the achievement of an agreement where Iran has an interest in complying, and the United States also has an interest in not destroying it again — even including Trump. But we may not be there yet. This process is difficult, and similar to Vietnam. If the agreement collapses, the fighting will continue. I remember, I used to work for Richard Holbrooke. One time in Paris, we were walking on the street, He pointed to a Hotel on the Place de la Concorde, where he first came with Kissinger to speak with North Vietnamese representatives when he was a young diplomat. He said, "I spent two weeks in this hotel. Then several years later, I came back to the same hotel, five years later, to continue negotiations. And ultimately, it was in this very hotel that the war ended. But in the period between those two rounds of negotiations, tens of thousands of Americans died."

He told me that as a lesson for negotiations with the Taliban. Meaning, the United States and the Taliban would ultimately speak. At that time, America refused to talk with the Taliban. But he said that many Americans and Afghans would die, yet we would still negotiate with them. And that is indeed what happened after he died. Ultimately the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban. Whether that was a good or bad agreement, that's how it ended. But in the process, far more Americans and Afghans died before reaching that point. Most likely the same thing could happen with Iran. Meaning, they could meet, then collapse, then meet again, then collapse again. Meanwhile, each side tries to impose its will on the other. But ultimately, unless the Islamic Republic collapses, this war must end at the negotiating table.

Yes, I agree with you. I think President Trump is dismantling the liberal international order with the belief that the United States will become the most dominant, fully controlling the world. But if the expansion of power in Iran actually reduces American strength, then the United States will not be able to control what happens after that order collapses. I also think that the Iranian example is very easily simplified in the West, because Iran is considered a "rogue" regime, a bad regime, so whatever happens to it is considered deserved, as if this only applies to Iran. I was quite surprised when recently the German chancellor said that international law should not apply to Iran. That was a very shocking statement. But the reality is, the world doesn't see it that way. Even countries that agree Iran behaves badly, supports terrorism, and so on, still believe the rules applied to Iran in this case have broader implications. Meaning, if toppling the leadership of a country is considered legitimate — this is different from when Israel killed Hezbollah or Hamas leaders — but if killing a country's leaders is considered acceptable, and not a single European country truly condemns it, even the guardians of international law don't condemn it, then that can apply to everyone, not just by the United States. Why wouldn't Putin do it? Why wouldn't Xi Jinping do it? Why wouldn't developing countries do the same to other developing countries? Right? If you can attack a country at will without being condemned, then essentially that can happen to anyone. And as more countries begin to worry about the possibility of "decapitation," about regime change through war like this, the more they will seek other alternatives. I read in the New York Times about a report of a recent meeting between the Brazilian president and the South African president. That was perhaps a few weeks ago when Ramaphosa was in Brazil.

And Lula told him, "We need to form some kind of pact, because if not, both of us could be attacked." This shows the kind of conversation now happening among countries that are actually not "rogue" states. These are mainstream countries that now must worry that Trump might want to overthrow Lula, or might want to overthrow Ramaphosa, or do things like that. And ultimately, you will reach the conclusion that the last deterrent is nuclear power. So instead of waging war against Iran and killing Khamenei to prevent proliferation, the United States may actually have accelerated that proliferation, and has no way to stop it. And I think we are entering a world that is far more dangerous, because unfortunately the West, including European countries, has basically endorsed a pattern of behavior that they can no longer prevent from becoming the new norm.

Thank you very much for having me. It was great to discuss with you.